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Abstract 
In order for a company to participate in mergers and acquisitions apart from 
personal motives whether economic or strategic reasons should exist. Ultimate 
goal for the activity associated with economic reasons is the value creation for the 
acquiring  firm’s  shareholders by realizing synergies through cost deduction and 
increased revenues. Strategic reasons summarize the  management’s policy to 
hedge against risks deriving from volatility and prevailing conditions within the 
industry and/or the area that the acquiring firm operates. An abundance of 
researches suggests that a merger transaction does not offer the desirable returns, at 
least to the shareholders of bidding firms which are expected to receive negative or 
zero returns. Despite past evidence, new finding deriving from the pharmaceutical 
sector indicate positive abnormal returns to acquirer. Our analysis resulted in negative 
CARs for the most examined event windows allowing however for further investigation 
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Introduction 
Corporations can grow whether organically or by merging and acquiring other 
companies.  Mergers and Acquisitions thus, constitute a favorable strategic tool which 
is employed for various reasons. Among them one could identify personal motives 
(hubris hypothesis- sin of pride), industry reasons, operational reasons and factors 
associated with synergies. To further illustrate, a company may seek for revenue 
enchancment and/or cost reduction by obtaining “pricing power” or by entering in 
new markets (operating synergy). Moreover, decreases in financing costs due 
diversification which allows companies to increase their debt capacity and decrease 
their before-tax cost of financing (financial synergies) might be another reason for 
merging or acquiring another firm. Managerial synergies finally, described as the 
replacement of “poor-performing management by a high-performing management 
team” constitute additional explanations.1 The exceptional M&A activity noticed the 
last few years, indicates, for many, a new M&A wave. In numbers, according to 
MergerMarket, the global value of deals reached at $2.87 trillion till the third quarter 
of 2015 representing the highest period since 2007. Total cross-border transactions 
amounted for $ 688.3 billion exceeded any similar period on record while mega deals 
43 in number reached at $1.1 trillion marking 32.4% higher value than 2014. The 
Energy, Mining & Utilities sector is ranked in the first place of the M&A preferred 
industries while Pharma Medical & Biotech sector is found on the second place with 
noteworthy increased market share from 10.6% in 2014 to 12.8% in 2015.   
  Pharmaceutical companies seek for M&A transactions in order to increase their 
revenues satisfying at the same time investors’ expectations. Considering the 
complexity in innovative medicines, buying a new blockbuster drug contains lower 
costs than to develop it internally. Low interest rates have render the capital cheaper, 
allowing big pharmaceutical firms to fund their M&As with debt. Amid the growth in 
drug distribution scale and the increased earnings via cut-costing, pharmaceutical 
companies, pursue M&As in order to achieve growth in revenues and in share price. 
Growth in revenues is noted decreased and the patent cliff from which companies 
secured billion ended a few years ago. Despite past evidence, whereby the acquirer’s 
shares would suffer losses due to the transaction costs, the acquisition of a company 
has significant potentials to reinforce firm’s revenues and this constitutes another 
explanation on why investors pressure pharmaceutical companies to engage into M&A 
transactions. 2 
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Above any other strategic explanation, corporations engage in mergers and 
acquisitions in order to create value. In other words, despite pitfalls in practice, a 
company should proceed in such activities under circumstances whereby the value 
created  from the transaction would be higher that the value in the absence of the 
merger or acquisition. 
An abundance of researches suggests that a merger transaction does not offer the 
desirable returns, at least to the shareholders of bidding firms which are expected to 
receive negative or zero. On the other hand, stockholders of target firms seem to 
receive positive returns. Market efficiency, introduced in the efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH, Fama 1970), indicates that prices can reflect all the available 
information of a market or a stock at any given time. This information could be 
summarized not only in official announcement or in researches but even in rumors as 
well. Hence, a significant event , like  a merger or an acquisition is immediately 
incorporated in firm’s share prices.  Scientific studies attribute these negative 
abnormal returns to the transaction cost that the acquiring company is expected to 
undertake. However, new evidence suggest that the recent booming activity in the 
field  allows both acquiring and target form’s shareholders to expect positive returns. 
This study aspires to present the Mergers & Acquisition subject from evidence derived 
from the pharmaceutical sector in Europe contributing the same time  in the research 
field identifying whether evidence are consistent with new statements that bidding 
shareholders are now receive positive returns. In the empirical application the 
standard event study methodology has been applied as described by Brown and 
Warner (1985). More specifically, in chapter 2 we introduce the rationale and the 
definitions of mergers and acquisitions presenting their historical background through 
Merger Waves. In the third chapter the assingement presents a market overview for 
the M&A activity with figures, facts and trends across global with necessary standing 
to the pharmaceutical industry in Europe. Subsequently, in chapter 4 we review 
interesting findings from literature sources that allow us to further interpret our topic. 
Chapter 5, describes the event study methodology, with the respective limitations, 
which employed in order to construct our calculations. Finally, in chapter 6 we 
describe our data providing the results from our research with the appropriate 
discussion. Conclusions, bibliography references and the appendix complete our 
presentation.  
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2. Mergers and Acquisitions: Their rationale and some definitions 
 In order for a company to grow in its sector or to establish itself in a new field mergers 
and acquisitions constitute a commonly used type of restructuring and aspect of 
strategic management. Although the terms are incorrectly used with no distinction, in 
fact, a merger describes the consolidation of two different companies into one entity 
while during an acquisition the bidder acquires the target company which remains an 
independent legal entity controlled by the acquirer. In theory, companies should 
perform an M&A transaction only if this is going to maximize shareholders’ value. In 
other words only “if the value of the acquirer and the target is greater if they operate 
as a single entity than as separate ones” 3.  
There is evidence that mergers and acquisitions are implemented for three significant 
reasons: 1) Individual motives, 2) Industry reasons and 3) Operational reasons4. The 
first case describes personal interests associated with bonuses, status positioning and 
ego matters (hubris hypothesis- sin of pride) while in the second one, globalization, 
competition and industry consolidation constitute the explanation. The third reason is 
related to value creation that is to ensure a better value for the products in order to 
satisfy customers and clients but mostly to increase earnings, dividends and share 
price in favor of shareholders.  But why a company merges rather than choose another 
method of restructuring? The inquiry provides for many answers. Primarily, the new 
entity could have a substantial market share deriving from product expansion and 
participation in larger resources. Moreover, cost reduction with fewer plants, facilities 
and combined production lines, joined with less competition under circumstances 
whereby the two entities are competitors could render merge a favorable option.  
Synergies, explained by economies of scale or due to vertical integration, would lead to 
decreased costs and higher revenues creating another motive for merge. And what 
about acquisition? Why a corporation would decide to acquire another entity?  In that 
case, strategic management is employed. For instance, a firm could acquire another in 
order to get access in a specific product or to constrain competition. To further 
explain, an emerging entity with new products, popular among customers, could be a 
potential threat for another one in the same line. The acquisition would also be an 
appraisal in cases where the acquirer decides to expand its size in order to obtain 
popularity and access in credit resources and funds. Likewise, the acquirer might need 
to exert influence in the industry obtaining rights on critical resources like innovative 
infrastructure or natural resources5.  
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 Even though mergers and acquisitions are preferred for many reasons, a significant 
amount of them fails since buying them considers easier than performing them. Arising 
issues, mostly due to lack of knowledge, negotiation pitfalls, incorrect planning or 
wrongly performed integration method, could render an M&A transaction vulnerable.  
Researches coming from the area of economic and finance suggest that success or 
failure can be recognized by measuring the share rates within the first days following 
the announcement of the transaction with the shareholders of the bidding firms to 
receive no profits in comparison to shareholders of the acquired company. An 
additional value in stocks would indicate a successful transaction whereas a decrease 
in stock price would be a failure signal. Strategic management and organizational 
behavior could also provide explanations related to the success or failure of mergers 
and acquisitions. The first one by advocating the weakness in predicting precise future 
cash flows due to constant changes and implementation discrepancies  and the second 
one by supporting “the lack of consideration of the human factor” during the 
implementation of the M&A strategy. 6 
In order to further understand the rationale behind mergers and acquisitions, their 
historical background and the waves at which they are occurring could be of utmost 
help. 
 
2.1 The M&A Waves 
The volume of mergers and acquisitions noticed unprecedented during the first years 
of the 21st century with a booming activity during the last few years which triggers 
discussion for a new M&A wave. These corporate finance tools have an interesting 
historical background which can be described in waves clustered by industry. In fact, 
the term “wave” describes both cumulative and industry waves while “cluster” is 
related to accumulated mergers in an industry.7It is noteworthy that a recession or a 
crisis constitutes significant signals for the end of a wave with the most recent example 
coming from the financial crisis of 2007. On the other hand, industrial and 
technological socks, regulatory changes and credit availability are factors that proved 
to have a positive effect on the start of a wave. 
First Wave: The first wave of mergers & acquisitions has its roots back to 1800s. This 
wave is characterized by Horizontal Mergers creating monopolies of major 
manufacturing and transportation giants in the U.S.A. (e.g. Standard Oil Company of 
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New Jersey, United States Steel Corporation, International Harvester Corporation). 
This wave ended in the early 1900s due to World War I. 
Second Wave: The second wave from 1919 – 1929 emerged automobile manufactures 
like FIAT and Ford. Government laws prohibiting anticompetitive practices led the 
companies to Vertical Mergers as a mean of growth. The crash in 1929 and the great 
depression was the end of this period. 
Third Wave: World War II kept mergers and acquisitions at a low level until 1950 when 
the third wave began. During that era, companies tried to expand their operations, 
focused on diversification and on risk mitigation. As a result, conglomerates were 
formed. The activity experienced a peak during 1968 and finally ended in 1973 with 
the oil crisis. 
Fourth Wave: High inflation rates with high borrowing costs and remarkably leveraged 
buyouts were the prime characteristics of the period 1974-1989. Companies, with 
investment banks as intermediates, chose mergers and acquisitions in order to reduce 
their financing costs and mitigate their exposure. The M&A boom allowed companies 
to sell their underperformed parts and focus on their main business operations. The 
excessive lending practices caused the collapse of banks capital structure and 
subsequently the end of the fourth wave.  
Although European companies had a significant presence to all described waves above, 
for many, the period 1987-1991 is the first truly European M&A wave due to the 
formation of the Single Market.  
Fifth Wave: The 90s started with an increase in the number and volume of cross-
border mergers & acquisitions. Cross-border trade zones such as European Union 
(E.U.), Mercosur and the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) comprised with 
larger economies of scale allowed the creation of multinational conglomerates. The 
pharmaceutical industry, with the creation of Pharmacia and of GlaxoSmithKline, 
constitutes an example of the aforementioned trend. The millennium bubble and 
scandal of companies like Enron and World.com caused the end of that era. 
Sixth Wave: Starting in 2003 the sixth wave was a mingling of cross boarder 
acquisitions, industry consolidation and leveraged transactions. Low interest rates with 
large amounts of available capital created a new booming period for M&A 
transactions. However, high liquidity alongside with speculation and distortions in the 
price of target companies led to the end of that wave of transactions in 2007.8  
From 2007 with the subprime crisis until 2010 and the followed economic downturn, 
M&A activities met their lowest level.  
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Seventh Wave: For many, 2011 seemed to be a new starting point for M&A 
transactions whereas others argued that the M&A activity should be distinguished 
from a bubble especially when the period is not characterized by substantial changes 
in the environment ( e.g. innovative technological developments) or lacks legislative 
changes and significant capital.9  Despite the fact that business world remains a 
volatile one, companies seem to accept the new standards deciding that “is easier to 
buy growth than build it”10. Thus, mergers and acquisitions constitute once again a 
favorable corporate choice with investments in industries like pharmaceutical and in 
continents like Africa to found among the first preferable place. 
 
3. A market overview 
Proceeding to present days, a market overview on global and on European region M&A 
activity would allow us to further realize their magnitude. 
During 2014, according to J.P.Morgan Outlook, global M&A by deal value met 35 deals 
of more than $10 billion in comparison to 20 deals of $462 billion in 2013. Additionally, 
global cross-border deals amounted for $625 billion were the highest since 2007 while 
the use of stocks for the M&A activity reached at 33% compared to 19% in 2013. “The 
increased regulatory considerations, interlopers and activist shareholders” led to $686 
billion failed deals reaching at the highest level since 2008. 
As to 2015, Delloite M&A index reports that the decreased oil prices, appreciation of 
the dollar, the strengthened role of China in M&A activity and the stockholders’ 
demand for additional value, alongside with events like elections in European 
countries and in the U.S.A. have a significant impact on M&A transactions. In numbers, 
according to MergerMarket, the global value of deals reached at $2.87 trillion until the 
third quarter of 2015 representing the highest period since 2007. Total cross-border 
transactions amounted for $ 688.3 billion exceeded any similar period on record while 
mega deals 43 in number reached at $1.1 trillion marking 32.4% higher value than 
2014. The Energy, Mining & Utilities sector is ranked in the first place of the M&A 
preferred industries while Pharma Medical & Biotech sector is found on the second 
place with noteworthy increased market share from 10.6% in 2014 to 12.8% in 2015. 
Financial Services are in the third place with their position to be improved from 7.1% in 
2014 to 12.4% in 2015. 
Transferring our point of convergence to European continent, although 2014 
represented a recovery year for M&A deals with a total value of $896.7 billion, 2015 so 
far amounts for $657.7 billion expressing a decrease of 4.2% compared with the 
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relevant period of 2014. The Q1-Q3 period is the lowest since 2013 and the total 
activity stays behind growth rates marked in U.S.A and Asia-Pacific. The U.K and Italy 
represent the two countries that boosted the M&A growth in Europe. In particular, the 
UK’s transactions, valued for $254.1 billion, had an increase of 63.4% compared to 
2014 while Italy with $52.2 billion reached the second highest post crisis value. Both 
countries have a region share of 46.6% while the relevant percentage for the whole 
2014 was 21.6. On the other hand, France noted $65.1 billion in M&A transactions in 
2015 marking a decrease of 60.9% compared to 2014. An explanation for the 
decreased European M&A activity would be the low levels of foreign investments 
which increased compared to 2014 by 6.8% representing however the highest Q1-Q3 
period on record with $258.5 billion. In European region, the Energy Mining and 
Utilities sector is ranked in the first place of the M&A preferred industries with a 
significant increase from $64 billion in 2014 to $115.2 billion in 2015.  Industrials and 
Chemicals are in the second place with a value of $81.6 billion in 2015 slightly 
increased from 2014 while Consumers sector from the third place meets a decrease 
from $78.6 billion in 2014 to $69.6 billion in 2015.11 
 
 
3.1  The Pharmaceutical Sector 
As mentioned above pharmaceutical industry draws investors’ attentions since 
constitutes one of the most profitable sectors. M&A transactions within the industry 
are noted significantly high all over the world following the increased activity that 
mergers and acquisition meet the last two years. European pharmaceutical activity 
however, seems to stay behind compared to other areas. 
The pharmaceutical sector is “responsible for the development, production and 
marketing of medications”. Hence, the industry is under intense laws and regulations 
regarding the patents, tests and safety. Brands and patented medicines constitute the 
largest part of pharmaceutical revenues. Compared to other industries, 
pharmaceutical sector depends heavily on research and development with 
pharmaceutical companies to prove this investing more than 20% of their revenues in 
R&D segment. The patent protection and the invention of new drugs are of utmost 
concern for the industry since the losses from patent expiry and from modest 
innovative practices could be a severe inhibitory factor for companies. The U.S.A. with 
companies like Johnson & Johnson, Pfizer and Merck with revenues, according to 2015 
Financial Times Global 500 list, $74.3 billion, $49.6 billion and $42.2 billion 
respectively, hold the largest share market. European companies like Novartis, Roche 
and Sanofi with revenues of $49.6 billion, $47.7 billion and $41.2 billion respectively, 
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follow in the second place while the Chinese pharmaceutical sector presents the 
highest growth rates over the last years.12 
Moving to M&A activity within the industry, companies rather than focusing on short-
term gains prefer mergers and acquisitions in order to acquire a better market 
position. Facing declining pipeline products, increased costs in the development of 
new products and an increasingly demanding market companies have reduced chances 
to achieve a premium pricing for their products. The rising demand for generics 
alongside with patent expiries are “driving consolidation” as Deloitte reports, with 
companies to seek for acquisition of all sizes. Pharmaceutical companies realize that 
being stable while product pipelines mature does not constitute a wise strategy. Thus, 
expanding their operations in emerging markets would generate growth increasing at 
the same time shareholders’ value. “Favorable debt financing, low interest rates and 
good credit supply for leveraged buyouts have all contributed  to the upswing in deal 
activity”. Confidence has been improved and transformations in the regulatory 
environment, pressures in prices and into costs comprised with technology 
developments and with going improvement for product pipelines are driving factors 
for the increased activity in the industry. Research and development financing has not 
bring the desired returns thus, mergers and acquisitions represent a choice of 
diversification for companies and an effort to reduce their R&D expenditures, resetting 
their corporate strategy. Tax inversion whereby companies take advantages of low 
corporate tax rates constituted a motivation for many years for the industry’s M&A 
transactions. These inversion deals are under uncertainty since governments set 
guidelines in order to curtail inversion tactics. In recent years, decreasing product 
pipelines and patent cliffs, due to governments’ deficit reduction programs as a tool to 
reduce health care expenditures are drivers for deal making. Companies need to 
specialize, resize and restructure their operations.13 
In numbers, 2014 had been a momentum year. Totally, 137 M&A transactions were 
announced and completed according to” pharma letter “ while the respective numbers 
were 122 in 2013 and 131 in 2012. In 2015, globally, the pharmaceutical sector has the 
second largest portion behind Energy, Mining & Utilities sector with a market share of 
12.8% while the percentage during 2014 was 10.6%, that is $367.5 billion and $251.4 
billion respectively in terms of value of deals. In a regional M&A comparison within the 
pharmaceutical sector, the U.S.A mark the highest M&A activity with a value of deals 
$271.4 billion in 2015 while the figure accounted for $124.5 billion in 2014. The U.S.A 
market is the largest free-pricing for pharmaceuticals with a favorable patent and 
regulatory environment. In Central & South America where countries struggled due to 
economic issues and due to the collapse of oil prices, pharmaceutical M&A activity 
reached at $2.267 million, 5.1% in terms of market share in 2015, while the deal value 
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in 2014 was $4.511 million that is 4.4% of market share. Asian region even though 
noted significant M&A transactions, the pharmaceutical sector was not among the 
preferable sectors while in Japan the situation could be described the same. In Africa 
and in Middle East though, emerging pharmaceutical markets boosted the M&A 
activity ranking the sector in the second place with a market share of 9.9% in 2015 
while the percentage in 2014 was only 1.2%. In deal value terms the amounts noted 
$2.745 million in 2015 and $417 million in 2014. Finally, in Europe, despite the fact 
that the region is considered one of the most actives in pharmaceutical M&A activity 
since the sector is a significant source of growth and competiveness, the industry met 
a shrinked market share from 15.2% in 2014 to 9.4% in 2015 with the deal values to be 
$104.6 billion and $62.0 billion respectively.  
Reaching at the end of 2015 the pharmaceutical industry still transmits signals of the 
impressive growth rates experienced over the last two years. The industry faces 
changes in the development of medicines and in business initiatives with diminished 
product pipelines, emerging and dynamic global markets and finally increasing demand 
for infectious and chronic treatments14.  According to PwC, by 2020, the sales and the 
marketing workforce will change since the industry walks from a mass-market to a 
target market model in order to add value on revenues. Challenges like rising 
customers’ expectations, modest scientific productivity and cultural sclerosis will still 
be present the forthcoming years while government and private health care providers’ 
refusal to fund costly drug treatments are anticipated to have significant impact on 
companies’ corporate strategies.  
 
4. Literature Review 
The need for constant change has rendered mergers and acquisitions a favorable 
practice and as such, they have widely been included in scientific researches. Examined 
whether by the sides of strategic management or by the finance field, post- merger 
performance of both acquiring and acquired companies has drawn the researchers’ 
attention. Do mergers and acquisition create value and benefits? Where does the 
reflected value come from? Do shareholders receive positive or negative returns? 
These are some of the inquiries tried to been answered by academics and researchers. 
Researchers from economic and finance fields evaluate M&A events measuring the 
firms’ stock performance since the share price contains all those public information 
                                                          
14
 World Health Organization (WHO) 
10 
 
associated to the company15. A higher stock price reflects a prosperous transaction 
whereas a decreased one considers as a negative outcome.  
A succeed or a failed M&A transaction, is related to several conditions like competitive 
advantages, the market growth rate and to the extent at which both acquirer and 
target are going to achieve a strategic fit . That “merger contingency framework” 
indicates that “the better the strategic fit between the acquiring and the acquired firm 
the greater is the potential value created by the merger”16. As Lubatkin (1983) 
illustrates, there are two positions about the acquirer’s benefits. The first one supports 
that mergers do not provide real benefits while the other one indicates that they do 
but for many reasons they have not been identified. In the first case, managers’ 
mistakes that amiss to proper identify” the potential contribution of each entity in the 
merger to the rate of future earnings growth of the surviving firm after accounting for 
risk” and conflicts of interests among managers and shareholders may lead to a 
neutral or negative post-merger performance. In the second case, Lubatkin mentions 
probable “administrative problems” as the ones that cancel out the benefits of an 
M&A transaction. These problems could described as different types of management 
and control. Another explanation for the non-detected benefits is the methodological 
issues which arised in empirical researches. Several studies consider accounting 
indicators in order to asses M&A transactions. However, these indicators may contain 
significant leverage, do not immediately reflect the event’s impacts and in many cases 
do not capture changes in levels of risk on returns.  
Contingency framework, introduced in past researches, reveals that mergers 
constitute “strategically heterogeneous acts” suggesting that one should primarily 
create a sample of mergers based on common strategic fit characteristics and 
subsequently apply the statistical methods. In a subsequent research, Lubatkin (1987) 
examines the “relationship between merger relatedness and stockholders’ value”. 
Finance studies identify mergers as “discrete, tactical” events and employ daily stock 
data since they consider short periods (e.g. 150 days before the event) which render 
the returns unbiased from additional events. He argues that in several cases the date 
of the event may not be defined and “what if tactics are related in a manner where 
each increases or decreases the probability of the final outcome”. Under these 
circumstances, these abnormal returns would only capture “the valuation of the 
marginal information” included in the specific merger. Thus, the real magnitude and 
the impact of the event would be biased.  Shcipper and Thompson (1983) contributed 
to this perspective by testing investor’s reaction under a company’s first 
announcement that was going to perform a series of M&As. Their findings detected 
that a percentage of the value of subsequent mergers was captured at that first 
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announcement. According to Lubatkin (1987) the “full performance” is the requested 
thus, one should employ long term returns in order include the full impact. However, 
long term returns might also reflect unrelated to the merger elements.  The “paired-
difference procedure and the averaging procedure” have been used to mitigate this 
limitation.  The paired-difference procedure reflects the firm’s “average monthly 
changes in the abnormal rate of return” and subsequently “is averaged with difference 
scores computing for other merging firms of the same merger type to form an 
averaged paired difference score”. Lubatkin (1987) concludes with two significant 
suggestions derived from his post-acquisition tests. Firstly, share prices constitute a 
reliable tool in order to measure the long-term impacts of an event in shareholders’ 
value. Finally, mergers offer permanent earnings to the stockholders of both bidding 
and target firms enhancing acquirer’s position in capital markets and towards 
competitors. 
“Market power, operating or financial synergy, tax gains, inefficient target 
management, overpayment, hubris, agency costs” are a few factors due to which, 
according to Capron and Pistre (2002), acquirers earn abnormal returns.  The value 
creation does not mean in every case that this value is going to be captured for the 
acquirer since competition between other bidders increases the target price until the 
final acquirer’s Net Present Value (NPV) is close to zero. Thus, acquirers are able to 
mark abnormal returns under the assumption of an imperfect competition. Such 
corporate control markets can be imperfectly competitive “(1) when private and 
uniquely valuable cash flows exist between a bidder and target. (2) When inimitable 
and uniquely valuable cash flows exist between a bidder and target and (3) when 
unexpected synergistic cash flows exist between a bidder and target”.   The existence 
of acquirer and acquiring relatedness alone does not provide bidding shareholders 
with abnormal returns (Barney, 1988).   In cases whereby target’s resources are 
removed to acquirer no contribution in the acquirer’s returns is expected since the 
market is going to transfer the “synergistic gains” to the acquired company.(1.“The 
synergistic benefits stem from the target’s resources”).  Under limited competition in 
the market, positive abnormal returns are expected to the acquirer. The premium is 
considered lower compared to discounted synergies hence, when the acquirer 
transfers resources to the acquiring company he is expected to receive a proportion of 
the synergistic earnings(2. “The synergistic benefits stem from the acquirer’s 
resources”). Finally, under circumstances of communal transfer, that is transfer of 
resources from the acquirer to the target and vice versa, a part of synergistic earnings 
is expected for the acquirer( 3.“The synergistic benefits stem from both acquirer’s and 
target’s resources”). Concluding, Capron and Pistre (2002), found consistent results 
associated with their first hypothesis. In that case, the target company has “a 
bargaining leverage” due to high competition among the bidders whereas the 
acquirers do not receive abnormal returns. High levels of risk derived from target’s 
resources and bring acquirers comfronted with “the lemon problem” (Ackerloff, 1970) 
12 
 
also support their findings. Their results advocate and the second scenario whereby 
the acquiring company has “a bargaining leverage”. Their third scenario is supported 
only to a certain extent since negative acquirer’s returns detected in cases where 
acquirer transfers his marketing resources to the target. However, there is evidence of 
positive effects when the target transfers market resources to the acquirer. 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) at their academic review resulted in positive returns to the 
stockholders of the acquired corporation while “bidding firm shareholders do not 
lose”. Several studies ( Mandelker 1974, Ellert 1976, Langetieg 1978) use the effective 
date as the event date however, the announcement date is considered more 
appropriate since any impact on the share price is reflected on and before the first 
announcement of the transaction. Their findings reveal “substantial and statistically 
significant increases” in the share prices of target firms under the condition of a 
successful transaction, whereas in an unsuccessful takeover, the weighted average 
abnormal returns appear almost equal to those of a successful merger. Evidence from 
the investigated studies indicates that “successful tender offers and mergers earn 
significantly positive abnormal returns on announcement of the offers and through 
completion of the offers. Targets of unsuccessful tender offers earn significantly 
positive abnormal returns on the offer announcement and through the realization of 
failure”. Targets of unsuccessful tender offers with no further offers loose all past 
earnings within a two-year period while targets of unsuccessful mergers drop their 
positive returns when the flop of the transaction becomes known. Evidence reveals 
that returns to successful bidding firms are zero while unsuccessful bids in mergers and 
tender offers lead to negative returns. Many researches resulted in systematic 
decreases in the share prices of bidding firms during the year after the transactions. 
Such negative abnormal returns are inconsistent with market efficiency hence, they 
are offsetting, indicating that any fluctuations in share prices during the event 
overstate future efficiency earnings from mergers. The fact that many studies use a 
retrospective selection bias with data unavailable at the announcement date in order 
to create a sample could be an interpretation for these abnormal returns. Non 
stationary parameters could lead in a negative drift however, as Capron and Pistre 
(2002) conclude, Lengetieg (1978) did not found a negative relationship between such 
factors and negative post-outcome return. Schipper and Thompson (1983) did not 
correlated legislative developments with negative abnormal returns, even though they 
are responsible for decreased merger profitability while Malatesta (1983) detected 
negative abnormal returns after regulatory modifications.  
Despite the magnitude of existing scientific researches and the popularity of the M&A 
activity among academics and connoisseurs the results vary due to the complexity of 
the subject and the specialization of every case. The impacts of such transactions and 
interpretations about whether positive or negative abnormal returns are attributed to 
shareholders have yet to be clarified, leaving in that way field for further investigation.  
13 
 
5. Methodological Framework 
The purpose of this study is to understand and measure the impact of the M&A activity 
on shareholder’s returns and subsequently on firm’s value hence, the event study 
approach has been employed.  
An event study is the analysis used in economics, finance, accounting and other 
research areas in order to estimate whether there is a statistically significant reaction 
in financial markets due to a given type of event that is hypothesized to have impacts 
on company’s market value. For instance, stock prices contain available information 
and expectancies for the future of the company (market efficiency). Thus, one by 
examining the impacts on the company’s share prices could define whether a 
particular event affects the firm’s future prospects.  Such an event could be within the 
company’s management like the announcement of a merger/acquisition and the 
announcement of a stock split but could also be outside of the firm’s control like 
regulatory or legislative announcements. Furthermore, the event could be part of 
different calendar dates or could be clustered at a specific date. The assessment 
investigates the normal returns, that are the expected returns if the hypothesized 
event had not occurred, and the abnormal returns which describe the returns caused 
by the event. (McKinley 1997) 
According to McKinley, the first step in order to conduct an event study is to 
determine the event of interest and specify the period under investigation, the event 
window. One should also define the selected criteria alongside with any potential 
biases for the included in the sample companies. For instance, indicative industry and 
event distribution information could be of help. Subsequently, both normal and 
abnormal returns should be measured. The normal returns could be estimated 
whether using the constant mean return measure which implies that a security’s mean 
return is constant over time or applying the market model which considers “a stable 
linear relation between the market return and the security return” (McKinley 
1997).After the definition of the parameter estimates the abnormal returns can be 
projected with the next step to be the establishment of the econometric model and 
the final one the presentation of the empirical results with the respective discussion. 
Return generating models such as the market model and the market adjusted model 
have been both included in several analyses. Alternative methods in calculation of 
abnormal returns like net-of-market return, net-of-characteristic matched portfolio 
return or the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) have also been used in many 
researches. The market model presents similarities with the CAPM however, in the 
absence of the risk-free rate, the intercept is considered as a constant. 
 In our case, equations (1) and (2) represent the market model and the market 
adjusted model respectively. E(R i,t) represents the return on the security i, at time t, 
14 
 
while aˆ i  and    ,as part of the market model regression, are ordinary least squares 
estimators of the intercept and slope respectively. Ε(R m,t), finally, indicates the return 
on the benchmark index which is employed as the proxy for the market portfolio. 
 ,
 =  +  ∗ ,
    (1) 
E(R i,t)  = Ε(R m,t)                (2) 
Equations (2) and (3) represent the market model and the market adjusted model 
which are used in order to estimate the abnormal returns. According to McKinley, “the 
abnormal return is the actual ex post return of the security over the event window 
minus the normal return of the firm over the event window”.  ARi,t   indicates the 
abnormal return for company i, at time t, whereas R i,t  refers to the return on security 
i, at time t. R m,t   denotes the return on the index and  aˆ i  and    are the linear least 
squares estimators which are used in the market model regression. 
,
 = ,
 −  −  ∗ ,
    (3) 
ARi,t  = R i,t  − R m,t                                   (4)   
 
In order for the Average Abnormal Returns to be calculated formula (5)  can be 
employed whereby, N indicates the number of corporations that announced a specific 
event, in our case an M&A transaction.  
               Ν  
AARt  = ∑ ARi,t       (5)  
                           i=1   N  
 
 Cumulative abnormal returns, defined as the “sum of the differences between the 
expected return on a stock (systematic risk multiplied by the realized market return) 
and the actual return often used to evaluate the impact of news on a stock price” 17, 
are calculated by equation (6) where T denotes the period for which the sum of 
abnormal returns are computing. 
                j 
CAR T = ∑ AR t      (6)  
                          t=i    
Similarly, the average cumulative abnormal returns is given at equation (7). 
                Ν  
ACAR T = ∑ CARi,T      (7)  
                              i=1    N 
 
                                                          
17
 Nasdaq.com 
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Subsequently, equation (8)  for the market model and (9) for the market adjusted 
model describe the t-statistic which is used in order to identify whether there is 
statistical significance, in other words , if the abnormal returns are significantly 
different from zero. For the market model, ARt   indicates the average  abnormal 
returns for time t and  S (AR
 t) denotes abnormal returns’ estimated standard 
deviation. 
In the market adjusted model, ARt  stands again for the average abnormal returns 
whereas S (AR
 t)  implies  the estimated standard deviation of the average abnormal 
returns at time t with N to denote the number of companies announced a 
merger/acquisition. 
              ___        ___ 
T-stat   = AR t /  (AR t)              (8) 
               ___        ___ 
T-stat   = AR
 t /  (AR t) *√N       (9) 
 
Finally, equations (10) and (11) estimate the t-statistic for the average cumulative 
abnormal returns in correspondence with the market model and the market adjusted 
model .In the first case, CAR T implies the average cumulative abnormal returns at 
time T  and  S (CAR T)  suggests the computed standard deviation of the average 
abnormal returns at T  time. Under the market adjusted model, CAR T  is the average 
cumulative abnormal returns with the S (CAR T)  to indicate the computed standard 
deviation of the cumulative abnormal returns at time T .  
               ___             ___ 
T-stat   = CAR T /  (CAR T) *√T     (10) 
               ___             ___ 
T-stat   = CAR T /  (CAR T) *√T     (11)18 
 
Despite the fact that a significant number of studies has employed whether market 
model method or Capital Asset Pricing Model, which both assume the market return as 
the only systematic factor in security generating structure, there is evidence that they 
are subjected into limitations. As Strong (1992) suggests, probable non- market 
consistencies in security returns indicate the presence of extra-market components 
which render the standard event study models misdescribed. Moreover, the size-
effect, related to the fact that shares with small capitalization have “higher risk-
adjusted returns on average, than large capitalization stocks”, might generate positive 
abnormal returns compared to the market index, even in cases where the transaction 
would not existed; “the opposite result would hold for larger firms”. Such extra-market 
and size-effect factors could described as “dividend yield, industry classification, 
systematic (beta) risk, residual risk”. The January effect could also be a potential 
                                                          
18
 Brown & Warner(1980,1985) , McKinley(1997) 
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disturbance factor. In cases whereby the benchmark expected returns do not identify 
the size-effect, calculations of abnormal returns do not depict fairly neither the small 
nor the large capitalization shares. Subsequently, according to Brown and Warner 
(1983), one should be cautious in circumstances where daily data are employed. Non-
normality describes the first interpretation for the above limitation. Daily share 
returns, opposite to monthly returns, contain significant inconsistencies from 
normality and presented “fat-tailed” compared to normal distribution. Non-
synchronous trading and market model parameter estimation constitutes the second 
limitation to daily data indicating that in cases whereby security’s returns and market 
index’s returns are calculated in different periods of trade, Ordinary Least of 
Squares(OLS) of market model parameters are not fairly captured and considered 
inconsistent. Finally, important properties captured by simulation restrict daily data 
since properties of t-statistic depend upon specific knowledge “of distributional 
properties of excess returns both in the time-series and cross-section”. Thus, the 
“degree of  non-synchronous trading” for instance could disturb mean and variance as 
well. 
 
 
  
6. Empirical Application 
Even though several studies related to M&A activity suggest that bidding firm’s 
shareholders receive negative or zero abnormal returns, due to expected transaction 
costs, new evidence suggest that bidding stockholders might anticipate positive 
impacts on their returns.  This study pursues to investigate the M&A activity and its 
impacts on bidding shareholder’s value in the European pharmaceutical sector since 
the continent constitutes a traditional area of M&A transactions with a pharmaceutical 
industry constantly present to the field. 
The M&A announcements have been extracted from Thompson ONE database for a 
period of seven years that is from 2007-2014. The quest included M&A transactions in 
European countries that have a strong presence in the pharmaceutical industry. We 
searched for public trading acquirers who announced bids for whether public or 
private companies. Both bidder and targets are within the pharmaceutical industry, 
bidders however, come from Europe while target companies mostly from countries 
like Tunisia, Russia, India, Turkey, Colombia, Brazil, China, South Korea etc. During 
2007-2014, 281 mergers and acquisitions were announced from companies located in 
Switzerland, the U.K, Germany, France, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Spain, Sweden, 
Norway and Austria. Due to multiple announcements from the same bidders, keeping 
only their first announcement and deleting companies for which there were not 
available data (e.g. many corporations had listed only a few days before the 
17 
 
announcement) we created a sample of 48 companies coming from the 
aforementioned European countries. Daily share prices, which allowed us to calculate 
the logarithmic returns, and appropriate indices extracted from Bloomberg database.  
The Appendix Table 1 contains the firms included in the sample and the 
announcement dates of mergers and acquisitions. Announcement date (day 0) is the 
day at which the first public announcement of the transaction is made, in other words, 
the date at which the market is informed officially. Past rumors related to the activity 
may have been captured in previous daily share prices rendering examined ones 
biased. In our analysis we used the standard event study methodology(Brown and 
Warner 1985) with market model and market adjusted model calculations. In 
particular, abnormal returns were computed for both market model and market-
adjusted model for a period of 261 days, that is -250 to +10 days with day 0 to 
represent the event date. Regression coefficients were calculated from day -250 to day 
-11 creating an examination period of 240 days. In order to include whether share 
prices reflect all available information(market efficiency) we computed the Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns(CARs) during the following periods(event windows), (-10, -1), (+1, 
+10), (-5, -1), (+1, +5), (-1, +1) and (-1, 0). Subsequently, we employed the t-statistic 
in order to test for statistical significance whereby the standard deviation of both 
average abnormal returns and average cumulative abnormal returns is calculated for 
240 days, from day -250 to day -11. Concluding, extreme values from the top and the 
bottom tails of our abnormal returns were excluded in order to avoid any outliers.  
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6. 1 Results and Discussion 
 
Table 1 below, presents the countries involved in our sample and the number of 
companies coming from them during period 2007-2014. As it can observed the United 
Kingdom with Germany have the strongest presence in the examined activity followed 
by France, Switzerland and Sweden. Year 2007 captures the highest activity while 2008 
and 2011 have also significant representation in our sample. 
               Table 1: Distribution of M&A activity in sample (in terms of country and   year) 
 
 
 
Table 2, depicts the abnormal returns and the t-statistic related to the event 
announcement for the market model and the market-adjusted model  As it can 
observed, the abnormal returns in the market model are consecutively negative from 
day -1 to day +3. From day -4 to day -2 there are positive abnormal returns which are 
noticed again at day +4. However, the market model provides non- statistical 
significant results rendering our interpretation limited, indicating at the same time that 
the movements could attributed to random factors. Abnormal returns in the market-
adjusted model seem to be negative around the date of announcement (day 0). In 
particular, from day -1 to day +1 ARs are as follows -0.203, -0.352, -0.496. From day -4 
to day -2 one can observe positive abnormal returns to the bidding shareholders. 
Especially, from day -4 to day -2 we observe abnormal returns of +0.352, +0.053 and 
+0.339.  At days -4 and -2 our observations are statistically significant at conventional 
                    
Market 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
Switzerland 1 
 
1 
 
1 
  
2 5 
United 
Kingdom 
4 1 1 2 1 
 
1 2 12 
Germany 2 3 1 2 1 
 
1 
 
10 
France 
 
3 
   
2 
 
1 6 
Belgium 
    
1 
   
1 
Denmark 
  
1 1 1 
   
3 
Italy 2 
       
2 
Spain 
      
1 
 
1 
Sweden 2 
   
2 
 
1 
 
5 
Norway 1 
 
1 
     
2 
Austria       1         1 
Total 12 7 5 6 7 2 4 5 48 
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level 5%.  Statistical significance at level 1% is depicted at day +3 whereby bidding 
shareholders receive negative abnormal returns.  
 
Table 2: Abnormal Returns (AR) and t-statistic around the M&A activity for the Market 
model and the Market-Adjusted model. 
N=48     
Market 
Model 
      
Market-
Adjusted 
  
Days   AR %   
t-
statistc 
  AR %   
t-
statistc 
-10 
 
-0,102 
 
-0,06 
 
-0,071 
 
-0,21 
-9 
 
0,123 
 
0,07 
 
0,155 
 
0,45 
-8 
 
0,073 
 
0,04 
 
0,096 
 
0,33 
-7 
 
0,233 
 
0,13 
 
0,256 
 
0,86 
-6 
 
0,028 
 
0,02 
 
0,045 
 
0,12 
-5 
 
-0,217 
 
-0,12 
 
-0,172 
 
-0,66 
-4 
 
0,343 
 
0,19 
 
0,352** 
 
1,31 
-3 
 
0,057 
 
0,03 
 
0,053 
 
0,24 
-2 
 
0,364 
 
0,20 
 
0,339** 
 
1,24 
-1 
 
-0,239 
 
-0,13 
 
-0,203 
 
-0,49 
0 
 
-0,348 
 
-0,19 
 
-0,352 
 
-0,61 
1 
 
-0,507 
 
-0,28 
 
-0,496 
 
-0,66 
2 
 
-0,414 
 
-0,23 
 
0,383 
 
-1,60 
3 
 
-0,886 
 
-0,49 
 
-0,857* 
 
-3,24 
4 
 
0,102 
 
0,06 
 
0,120 
 
0,39 
5 
 
-0,507 
 
-0,28 
 
0,484 
 
-1,47 
6 
 
0,007 
 
0,00 
 
0,051 
 
0,18 
7 
 
-0,225 
 
-0,12 
 
-0,214 
 
-0,38 
8 
 
-0,390 
 
-0,22 
 
-0,358 
 
-1,15 
9 
 
-0,214 
 
-0,12 
 
-0,151 
 
-0,43 
10   -0,187   -0,10   -0,129   -0,54 
Notes: Abnormal returns for the market model are estimated by the following 
equation: ARi,t = Ri,t – αi - βι*Rm,t whereby Ri,t denotes the return of company i on day t 
and  Rm,t is the market return on day t. Abnormal returns for the market-adjusted 
model 
are estimated by the following equation: ARi,t = Ri,t – Rm,t .* and **  indicate statistical 
significance at 1% and 5%  level respectively. 
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Table 3 presents the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and the t-statistic for the 
market model and the market-adjusted model and for the following event windows (-
10, -1), (+1, +10), (-5, -1), (+1, +5), (-1, +1) and (-1, 0). In the market model the 
cumulative abnormal returns are negative for the most event windows however, 
our results provide no statistical significance. Market-adjusted model on the other 
hand, depicts negative cumulative abnormal returns for the following event 
windows, (+1 +10), (+1 +5), (-1 +1) and (-1, 0) with the values to be -2.900, -2.100, 
-1.051 and -0.555 respectively. The aforementioned cumulative abnormal returns 
show statistical significance at 1% level. In other words, our observations allow us 
to be 99.9% positive that our results are not related to random chance alone.  
 
Table 3: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) and t-statistic around M&A activity for 
the following event windows (-10, -1), (+1, +10), (-5, -1), (+1, +5), (-1, +1) and (-1, 0) 
related to Market model and Market-Adjusted model. 
      
Market 
Model 
      
Market-
Adjusted 
  
Event Windows   CAR%   
t-
statistic 
  CAR%   
t-
statistic 
         
CAR (-10 -1) 
 
0,663 
 
0,12 
 
0,851 
 
0,88 
CAR (+1 +10) 
 
-3,220 
 
-0,56 
 
-2,900* 
 
-3,18 
CAR (-5 -1) 
 
0,308 
 
0,08 
 
0,369 
 
0,44 
CAR (+1 +5) 
 
-2,212 
 
-0,55 
 
-2,100* 
 
-2,67 
CAR (-1 +1) 
 
-1,094 
 
-0,35 
 
-1,051* 
 
-4,15 
CAR (-1 0)   -0,587   -0,23   -0,555*   -3,74 
Notes: .* and **  indicate statistical significance at 1% and 5%  level respectively. 
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Conclusions 
 
In order for a company to participate in mergers and acquisitions apart from 
personal motives whether economic or strategic reasons should exist. Ultimate 
goal for the activity associated with economic reasons is the value creation for the 
acquiring  firm’s  shareholders by realizing synergies through cost deduction and 
increased revenues. Strategic reasons summarize the  management’s policy to 
hedge against risks deriving from volatility and prevailing conditions within the 
industry and/or the area that the acquiring firm operates19. The inquiry about 
whether mergers and acquisition create positive value to the acquiring company 
has attracted the attention by several academics producing several interesting 
researches. Although traditional studies suggest  that acquirers receive zero or 
negative abnormal returns new evidence from the pharmaceutical field suggest 
that M&As can provide positive returns to shareholders of both bidding and target 
firms. Our analysis attempted to contribute to empirical evidence applying the 
standard event study methodology in order to test the king of returns that bidding 
shareholders receive. Market model and Market-Adjusted model have been both 
used in our research. Our results relatively to abnormal returns(market-adjusted 
model) suggest that acquirers receive positive abnormal returns before the 
announcement date  (date 0) at 5% significance level. Furthermore, a statistical 
significant observation(1% level) at day +3 indicates negative abnormal returns 
after the announcement date. Finally, cumulative abnormal returns(CARs) under 
the market-adjusted model indicate negative prices to acquirers at the following 
event windows (+1 +10), (+1 +5), (-1 +1) and (-1, 0) with the values to be -2.900, -
2.100, -1.051 and -0.555 respectively(1% level).  All things considered, our analysis 
allows for further investigation since the findings provide diverse signals. 
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 «The Economic Impact of M&A” Cass Business School 
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Appendix 
 
                                                         Appendix Table 1:  
                                             List of companies included in our analysis 
 
Acquiror Name   
  Date 
Announced 
1 Roche Holding AG RO SW Equity                                                    12/18/2014
2 Siegfried Holding AG SFZN SW Equity                                                  11/28/2014 
3 Santhera Pharm Hldg AG SANN SW Equity                                                  08/17/2009
4 Bachem AG BANB SW Equity                                                  06/18/2007 
5 Cytos Biotechnology AG CYTN SW Equity                                                  10/20/2011
6 Sinclair IS Pharma PLC SPH LN Equity                                                   04/15/2014
7 Vectura Group Plc VEC LN Equity                                                   03/13/2014
8 AstraZeneca PLC AZN LN Equity                                                   12/04/2013 
9 Lipoxen PLC XEN LN Equity                                                   08/04/2011 
10 Allergy Therapeutics PLC AGY LN Equity                                                   07/01/2010
11 Alliance Pharma PLC APH LN Equity                                                   02/08/2010
12 Shire PLC SHP LN Equity                                                   02/20/2009
13 BTG PLC BTG LN Equity                                                   09/18/2008 
14 
Dechra Pharmaceuticals 
PLC DPH LN Equity                                                   
12/12/2007 
15 GlaxoSmithKline PLC GSK LN Equity                                                   11/21/2007
16 
Hikma Pharmaceuticals 
PLC HIK LN Equity                                                   
04/20/2007 
17 Amarin Corp PLC AMRN LN Equity                                                  12/05/2007
18 curasan AG CUR GY Equity                                                   06/04/2013
19 MorphoSys AG MOR GY Equity                                                   03/15/2011 
20 Wilex AG WL6 GY Equity                                                   11/03/2010 
21 Evotec AG EVT GY Equity                                                   07/14/2010
22 PAION AG PA8 GY Equity                                                   04/10/2008 
23 Novartis AG NOT GY Equity                                                   02/26/2008 
24 Merck KGaA MRK GY Equity                                                   01/17/2008
25 STADA Arzneimittel AG SAZ GY Equity                                                   08/31/2007
26 Bayer Schering Pharma AG SCH GR Equity                                                   03/26/2007
27 
Sanochemia 
Pharmazeutika AG SAC GY Equity                                                   
09/30/2009 
28 Sanofi SA SAN FP Equity                                                   09/28/2012
29 Stallergenes SA GENP FP Equity                                                  07/21/2014
30 Vetoquinol SA VETO FP Equity                                                  11/25/2008 
31 Ipsen SA IPN FP Equity                                                   06/04/2008
24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 Virbac SA VIRP FP Equity                                                  04/23/2008
33 Flamel Technologies SA FLML UQ Equity                                                  03/14/2012
34 UCB SA UCB BB Equity                                                   11/22/2011
35 NeuroSearch A/S NEUR DC Equity                                                  04/27/2011
36 ALK-Abello A/S ALKB DC Equity                                                  04/26/2010 
37 Novo Nordisk A/S NOVOB DC Equity                                                 01/16/2009
38 Recordati SpA REC IM Equity                                                   09/28/2007
39 Pierrel SpA PRL IM Equity                                                   07/17/2007
40 Almirall SA ALM SM Equity                                                   12/17/2013 
41 Meda AB MEDAA SS Equity                                                 04/27/2007
42 Orexo AB ORX SS Equity                                                   10/15/2007
43 Medivir AB MVIRB SS Equity                                                 04/11/2011
44 Midsona AB MSONB SS Equity                                                 02/11/2011 
45 Moberg Pharma AB MOB SS Equity                                                   12/06/2013 
46 Navamedic ASA NAVA NO Equity                                                  08/21/2007
47 Photocure ASA PHO NO Equity 10/27/2009 
48 Intercell AG ICLL AV Equity                                                  05/06/2010
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